Making the modern criminal law: a response by Farmer, Lindsay
 
 
 
 
 
Farmer, L. (2019) Making the modern criminal law: a response. 
Jurisprudence, 10(1), pp. 110-113. (doi: 10.1080/20403313.2019.1580443). 
 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/183913/    
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 16 October 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
 
1 
 
Making the Modern Criminal Law: A Response 
 
In the long process of writing a book there develops a difference between the book that the 
author imagines themselves to be writing and the book that it is actually produced. The one is 
written in a lucid prose, each point is deftly and concisely made, arguments clearly set out 
and defended, and objections anticipated and dismissed. The actual book is inevitably less 
clearly argued, contradictory in parts, and where ideas are too often raised and left under-, or 
even un-, developed. The task of the reader is then to attempt to make sense of the printed 
page, and perhaps to show how the former can still be glimpsed in amongst the stumblings 
and hesitations of the latter. It is my great good fortune that my readers in this symposium 
have recognised both of these dimensions. They are generous in their reconstructions of the 
argument: identifying clear lines of argument and providing neat encapsulations of points that 
I wanted to make. And their criticisms are constructive: pointing out where I might have 
taken the argument or drawing attention to things that I overlooked as I struggled to draw the 
argument together. In doing this they close the gap between my ‘imaginary’ book and the 
actual printed book, and I am grateful to them for the generosity of their comments, as well as 
for providing me with this opportunity to revisit – and hopefully clarify – some of the original 
arguments. 
 A principal aim of the book is to develop a critical perspective on contemporary 
criminalisation debates – thinking about the proper scope of the criminal law or the factors 
that we should take into account when ‘making’ the criminal law – but in doing so it opens 
out into broader issues. First, I argue that even to think about ‘criminalization’ as a distinct 
question, as has now become commonplace in criminal law theory, requires that we have 
some prior conception of the relationship between criminal law, as a distinct body of rules 
with a defined area of application, and ‘crime’ as the object to be regulated.1 Accordingly, 
one of questions that the book explores is how this understanding of the criminal law (and 
thus of the criminalization question) has developed. It thus looks at the question of how the 
modern criminal law – as a coherent, internally unified body of rules, distinct from other 
areas of law – was ‘made’ in the period since the late eighteenth century. This is not to claim 
that there were not laws relating to crime that were older, or that some of the rules and 
doctrines that were developed from the late-eighteenth century onward did not draw on long-
established legal doctrines. It is, however, to argue that these rules were reconfigured in a 
new way into something that could newly be described as criminal law. This had both a 
descriptive and normative content: describing those rules that were understood by 
practitioners to be part of the criminal law, but also developing normative criteria by which it 
would be possible to judge whether or not a rule was ‘properly’ understood as a rule of 
criminal law. Criminal law is thus to be understood as something that is made, and which 
does not pre-exist the kind of institutional practices which make it.  
This part of the argument is largely historical, looking at the development of the legal 
concepts and institutional structures, from rules of jurisdiction to concepts of criminal 
responsibility, which created an internal doctrinal or theoretical coherence. In doing so I also 
demonstrate that there have been different periods in the making of the modern law, in which 
the relationship between criminal law and its object has been thematised in different ways – 
and that these are also broadly connected to changes in the social function of the criminal 
law. This, at the very least, should alert theorists to the need for caution, when making claims 
about certain essential features or qualities of criminal law. These features, I hope to have 
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shown, are much more contingent than is often assumed and should not be asserted 
unquestioningly in debates about criminalization. 
A second set of arguments, is the claim that the development of the modern criminal 
law is linked to a more general aim of “securing civil order”.2 This is in part a claim that the 
scope of the criminal law, and hence of criminalization, cannot be understood solely in terms 
of the interests to be protected, but also requires reflection on the purposes or aims of that 
protection, on the kind of order that is being secured through law. I argue that theories of 
criminalization have focused on goods or interests (and wrongs or harms to these) at the cost 
of considering the aims of the law, and that a normative theory of criminalization should also 
address the question of aims. And I then go on to show in different area of the law (offences 
against property, the person, and sex) how beliefs about the aims of particular laws, and their 
contribution to ‘civilising’ conduct, have shaped legal development. More broadly this idea 
of securing civil order operates as a normative framework that opens up a different 
perspective on how the modern law has developed. Civil order, I argue, is a way of capturing 
the social imaginary of modern law, in which self-governing individuals are guided by 
general rules and interact in civil society and the market.3 It is not an idea with a fixed 
content, as conceptions of what is or is not civil, and how this might best be secured, are 
contested and change over time; but the aim of securing civil order can nonetheless be seen as 
a relatively fixed aim of the modern criminal law. This idea of civil order also shapes the 
structure and content of laws, whether it be in terms of ideas of civility, ‘civilized’ social 
conduct, or their role in making or protecting civil society. The importance of the idea of 
securing civil order, then, for a normative theory of criminalization, is not that it is seeking to 
prescribe the form or content of the criminal law, but that it places normative questions about 
the scope of the criminal law within the institutional framework of modern society. 
One of the questions raised by commentators is whether this framework over-
simplifies, imposing a thematic and historical unity on the field. As Lacey suggests, the 
development of the criminal law might better be understood as a spectrum of developments 
rather than distinctive moments.4 And Lacey, Papacharalambous and Ramsay all raise 
questions about my use of the term ‘polycentrism’ to describe “patterns of criminalisation 
which in different ways pull against, or raises questions about, unifying tendencies in the 
criminal law”.5  What, indeed, is the relationship between unifying and separating tendencies 
in the criminal law on my account? What is the purpose of the introduction of the term 
‘polycentrism’ when my account is principally focused on detailing the efforts to systematise 
the criminal law? 
The term ‘polycentrism’ is taken from George Fletcher’s magisterial Rethinking 
Criminal Law, in which he suggested not only that there might be different patterns of 
liability in the development of the criminal law, but that the general part of the criminal law 
should be sensitive to this diversity.6 While this raises the possibility of a different kind of 
criminal law theory – one that is more plural and is not looking for ‘master’ principles of 
responsibility, or criminalisation, or whatever else – the idea is undeveloped in Fletcher’s 
work.7 This, however, is something that I wanted to raise in my book. Much criminal law 
                                                 
2 N MacCormick, Institutions of Law (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007) p.293. 
3 C Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2004). 
4 Lacey, p.5 (m/s). 
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theory is understood as a search for general principle or the uncovering of a pre-existing unity 
– whether this be sought in moral and ethical theory or in legal practice – as properties which 
are in some way inherent to criminal law. By contrast to this, I attempt to show, on the one 
hand, that the search for unity is a distinctively modern project and, on the other hand, that 
different areas of law pursue different ends and that it is consequently neither easy nor 
necessarily desirable to draw them into some grand unifying project simply for the sake of 
unity itself. Normatively we should be wary of the demand for uniformity as it is not 
sensitive to aims of particular areas of the criminal law and may also, as I sought to show in 
relation to sexual offences, lead to further criminalisation. 
 This does not mean, however, that there may not be an underlying unity of a different 
kind, as Ramsay points out. I agree with his account of the existence of the underlying pattern 
of responding to “the vulnerability of law’s subjects to the actions of others” – and how could 
I not, for I drew on his impressive work in The Insecurity State!8 However, I disagree with 
his claim as to its significance (or at least his suggestion that I have not recognised the logic 
or significance of my own argument). Both Carvalho and Ramsay point to this underlying 
pattern to suggest that there is a contradiction at the heart of the modern criminal law.9 For 
Carvalho this lies in the contradiction between the role of the criminal law in both promoting 
and restricting freedom, which he sees as being linked to the contradictions of the civilising 
process itself – that it produces just those violent tendencies which it is continually seeking to 
repress. The criminal law, in other words, as it seeks to civilise, continually denies its own 
violence and its own contingency.10 For Ramsay, the paradox is systematic of a deeper 
contradiction within liberalism itself and reveals the exhaustion and decay of the liberal 
project. He argues that a penal dystopia has taken the place of the ideal civil order as 
expanding civility and autonomy lead to the recognition of the need for protection of more 
interests and vulnerabilities – and an increased dependence on the state.11 I do indeed 
acknowledge that there is a paradox, which is that despite the desire to limit state power 
criminal law has expanded in scope, more or less continually since the late eighteenth 
century.12 However, by seeing this as a paradox rather than a contradiction I mean to place 
myself outside the kind of critical theory appealed to by both Carvalho and Ramsay. It is not 
that there is a fixed idea of liberal freedom which is continually undermined, but rather that in 
this tension the meaning of freedom is continually being reshaped.13 As Papacharalambous 
recognises, the aim of my project was not to produce an overtly political critique of the 
criminal law of the kind which Ramsay and Carvalho envisage, and this is also why in the 
conclusion I shy away from offering the kind of prescriptive accounts of criminal law found 
in many theoretical accounts.14 This may be a failing of the book in the eyes of some readers, 
but it is an approach that I would defend. 
I want finally to comment on the question of the relationship between punishment and 
the criminal law. My aim in the book was to ‘decouple’ criminal law from punishment in the 
specific sense that I argue that the aims of the criminal law should not defined in terms of 
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punishment.15 I make this claim for a number of reasons: it places too much weight on moral 
philosophical justifications; that the criminal law performs social functions other than merely 
punishing wrongdoing; and because it leads us to neglect criminal law’s public dimensions. 
However, as both Lacey and Carvalho point out, punishment keeps coming back in – both in 
general and to my own account – as both a justification for particular practices or reforms and 
as part of the general legitimatory framework of criminal law in the modern state.16 This 
point is very well made, but I would nonetheless defend my approach. The argument for 
seeing the aims of criminal law and punishment as distinct should primarily be understood a 
conceptual distinction aimed at opening up space for broader reflection on the aims of the 
criminal law. I am not denying that there is a link in practice between criminal law and 
punishment, or indeed that state punishment must be justified. Rather, I seek to challenge the 
taken for granted nature of the linkage, by asking how (and when) the linkage has been made, 
and what are the consequences of the way that the conceptual link with punishment has been 
drawn. Why, for example, as Lacey points out, is the responsible subject of what I call 
contemporary ‘neo-classical’ criminal law seen as the ‘punishable subject? My point here is 
that the focus on justified punishment of an individual offender obscures the social functions 
of criminal law in censuring certain forms of conduct, and the wider expansion of criminal 
liability.17 More broadly, then, the aim of the project is to ask how we might develop a 
normative theory of criminal law if we begin from the fact of criminal law being a social 
institution rather than the ‘fact’ of punishment – and I am grateful to my commentators for 
their recognition of this point and their generous readings of the book. 
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